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ABSTRACT 
The judicial selection and retention provisions of the Alaska Constitution, 
found in Article IV, achieve a delicate and remarkably successful balance 
between competing interests. The purposes of this article are to describe this 
constitutional plan (called “merit selection” because it begins with nomination 
based on merit alone), explain why the founders adopted it, examine historical 
challenges to it, and assess its performance on the 60th anniversary of Alaska 
statehood. 
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I. MERIT SELECTION OF JUDGES 
A. Nomination by the Judicial Council 
The process of judicial selection in Alaska begins with nomination 
by the Judicial Council.1 The Council is a seven-member body, composed 
of three lawyers chosen by the Board of Governors of the Alaska Bar 
Association; three public members appointed by the governor and 
confirmed by the legislature; and the chief justice.2 The members of the 
Council serve six-year terms, staggered to prevent a single governor or 
Board of Governors from exercising excessive authority over the 
Council’s composition.3 This first step in the judicial selection process 
focuses on merit: Constitutional Convention delegate Ralph Rivers stated 
that “the judicial council will seek for the best available timber” to send 
to the governor.4 Delegate Frank Barr noted the attributes that the Council 
would seek in a judge: “He should have in qualifications, first, ability and 
experience. Secondly, he should have integrity and a willingness to 
render impartial decisions.”5 The Council must nominate at least two6 
applicants for the governor’s consideration.7 
 
 1.  ALASKA CONST. art. IV, § 5. 
 2.  ALASKA CONST. art. IV, § 8. For an in-depth explanation of Alaska’s 
system, see Antonia Moras, A Look at Judicial Selection in Alaska, 21 Alaska Justice 
Forum #3: 1, 7–9. 
 3.  Id. at 13. 
 4.  Proceedings of the Alaska Constitutional Convention [hereinafter PACC], 
at 594, available at http://www.akleg.gov/pdf/billfiles/Constitutional 
Convention/Proceedings/Proceedings%20-%20Complete.pdf. 
 5.  The Judicial Council has incorporated precisely these attributes in the 
polling of attorneys that it conducts on all judicial applicants. Judicial Selection 
Procedures, ALASKA JUD. COUNCIL, http://www.ajc.state.ak.us/selection/ 
procedures/procedures (last visited Aug. 28, 2018). The Council polls on 
professional competence, integrity, fairness, temperament, and suitability of the 
applicant’s legal experience for the position sought. Id. 
 6.  The delegates debated whether the Council should be required to 
nominate a greater number of applicants, but settled on two nominees in 
recognition of Alaska’s small population of attorneys and the possible difficulty 
of finding qualified candidates. PACC, supra note 4, at 585 (remarks of Delegate 
McLaughlin) (“We figured because of the size of the Territory, initially it would 
be preferable [to require only] two names.”). This has proven to be a well-founded 
concern, especially in very sparsely populated rural areas. Twelve times since 
1976 the Judicial Council, after advertising a vacancy, has been unable to forward 
two names to the governor. E-mail from Susanne DiPietro, Exec. Dir., Alaska Jud. 
Council, to the authors (August 27, 2018, 10:20 AKST) (on file with the authors). 
On five occasions only one of the applicants was deemed qualified. Id. On three 
occasions no applicants were deemed qualified. Id. On four occasions the 
Council’s meeting was postponed because too few people applied. Id. In each 
instance the Council was required to re-initiate the process. Id. 
 7.  The Council’s bylaws, based on the record of the Constitutional 
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B. Appointment by the Governor 
The second phase of the selection process is appointment by the 
governor, who is limited in his or her choice to those persons nominated 
by the Judicial Council.8 An enduring concern of the majority of the 
delegates was injecting politics into the selection of judges.9 At the same 
time, the delegates recognized that the governor, as representative of the 
people, should have an important role in the appointment process. As 
delegate Ralph Rivers expressed it, in supporting the notion that the 
governor should make the appointment (rather than, as proposed by 
delegate Victor Rivers, the senate doing so), appointment by the governor 
“is positive with some decency of approach and thinking the [J]udicial 
[C]ouncil will seek for the best available timber, and we take a bow to the 
governor in taking his choice of [the] persons that are nominated . . . .”10 
Expressed another way, the delegates recognized that elections have 
consequences. While ever vigilant against the politicization of the process 
of selecting judges,11 they were prepared to give the governor the job of 
selecting between those nominees who were the most highly qualified. 
 
Convention, require it to “select two or more candidates who stand out as the 
most qualified under the criteria set out in Article I, Section 1 of these bylaws.” 
ALASKA JUD. COUNCIL, Bylaws, Article VII, § 4. Those criteria are the five listed in 
note 5, above, plus these two: “judgment, including common sense,” and 
“demonstrated commitment to public and community service.” Id. 
 8.  ALASKA CONST. art. IV, § 5. 
 9.  PACC, supra note 4, at 584 (statement of G. McLaughlin); PACC, supra 
note 4, at 589 (statement of W.O. Smith); PACC, supra note 4, at 589 (statement of 
W. Taylor); PACC, supra note 4, at 593–94 (statement of R. Rivers). In the Staff 
Paper prepared by Public Administration Service for the Delegates to the Alaska 
Constitutional Convention, found in Constitutional Studies, Alaska 
Constitutional Convention, v. 2, the authors concluded their discussion of 
selection methods with this observation: 
Certainly the judge should be independent of political and personal 
pressures. This concept of the independent judiciary is one of the truly 
important features of American democratic government. How best to 
obtain and retain that independence for the judges of the State of Alaska 
is based in no small measure on the method of selecting judges which is 
chosen by the Alaskan Constitution. 
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION SERVICE, CONSTITUTIONAL STUDIES: THE JUDICIAL 
DEPARTMENT, VOL 2, § VII, at 31 (1955). 
 10.  PACC, supra note 4, at 594 (statement of R. Rivers). 
 11.  As Delegate Edward V. Davis expressed the sentiment of the body: 
“[W]ithout qualification, I believe I could say that all of us here want an 
independent judiciary, a judiciary that will not be swayed by the public will at 
any particular moment, a judiciary that will not be subject to political pressure, a 
judiciary that will not be subject to pressure from the executive branch of the 
government.” PACC, supra note 4, at 598 (statement of E. Davis). 
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C. Retention (or Rejection) by the Electorate 
The third phase in the merit selection process is the “democratic 
check” provided by the retention election provisions of Section 6 of 
Article IV.12 If the first phase of the selection process was to be based on 
merit, and the second a recognition of the appropriate influence of 
political considerations in the process, the third phase reflects the 
founders’ belief that the electorate should play a role in determining 
whether a judge should remain on the bench. 
As the Chairman of the Committee on the Judiciary, George 
McLaughlin, stated during debate on the provision, “Roughly, three and 
one-half or four years later, the judge is required, every judge without 
exception, is required to go on the ballot for approval by the voters. . . . 
The only requirement on a nonpartisan ballot could be, ‘Shall Judge Blank 
be retained in office?’”13 Chairman McLaughlin noted that the plan 
represented a compromise: 
It is the best compromise and the best solution to a vexing 
problem between those who feel we should have lifetime tenure 
so the judges can be absolutely independent or whether we 
should have a short term so the judges could be subject to the 
popular will. The popular will should be expressed even in the 
control of the judiciary, but the way to control it is to put the 
judge on a nonpartisan ballot. . . .  He is running against himself, 
he is not running against someone else.14 
The retention process is open, exhaustive, and invites public 
participation. Alaskan voters have access to a truly impressive amount of 
information in deciding whether to retain a judge. The Judicial Council 
investigates the performance of every judge on the ballot, surveying every 
lawyer in the state, as well as all police officers, social workers, court 
employees, and jurors who have appeared in the judge’s court.15 The 
Council also conducts public hearings16 and interviews litigants who have 
 
 12.  “Each supreme court justice and superior court judge shall, in the manner 
provided by law, be subject to approval or rejection on a nonpartisan ballot at the 
first general election held more than three years after his appointment.” ALASKA 
CONST. art. VI, § 6. The legislature subsequently provided for retention elections 
for the legislatively-created district court, ALASKA STAT. § 22.07.070 (2016), and 
court of appeals, ALASKA STAT. § 18.85.050 (2016). 
 13.  PACC, supra note 4, at 586 (statement of G. McLaughlin). 
 14.  Id. 
 15.  Retention Evaluation Procedures, ALASKA JUD. COUNCIL, http://www.ajc. 
state.ak.us/evaluating-judges/retention-evaluation-procedures (last visited Aug. 
28, 2018). 
 16.  Id. 
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been in the judge’s court.17 Further, the Council analyzes the affirmance 
rates for trial judges18 and the number of times the judge is pre-empted 
from hearing cases.19 Moreover, the Council examines the judge’s 
timeliness in rendering decisions20 and, in appropriate cases, the Council 
interviews the judge standing for retention.21 Finally, the Council goes to 
great lengths to publicize all of the information obtained.22 At the end of 
this process, the Council votes, in open session, to recommend to the 
voters either to retain or not to retain the judge.23 
Following the first retention election for an individual judge, the 
judge must stand again for retention on a schedule determined by the 
judge’s level of court: every four years for district court,24 every six years 
for superior court,25 every eight years for the court of appeals,26 and every 
10 years for the supreme court.27 
To summarize, Alaska’s merit selection and retention system is a 
three-part process: First, the Judicial Council nominates two or more 
judicial candidates on the basis of merit by considering their professional 
competence, integrity, fairness, temperament, suitability of experience, 
judgment and common sense, and demonstrated commitment to public 
service. Next, the governor appoints from the list of those nominated, 
presumably choosing the appointee who best meets the governor’s 
criteria for judicial excellence. Finally, after two or three years, the voters 
determine whether the judge will remain on the bench. 
II. WHY THE FOUNDERS ADOPTED A MERIT-BASED SELECTION 
SYSTEM 
When Alaska’s Constitutional Convention convened on November 
8, 1955, the delegates on the Judiciary Committee enjoyed unique freedom 
to shape Alaska’s judicial system. The Second Organic Act—which 
 
 17.  Id. 
 18.  Id. 
 19.  Id. 
 20.  Id. 
 21.  Id. 
 22.  The Judicial Council “widely publicizes the evaluation process through 
frequent press releases, personal contacts with radio and television stations, 
speeches to public groups such as community councils and feature articles in 
newspapers.” Id. 
 23.  Frequently Asked Questions About Retention, ALASKA JUD. COUNCIL, 
http://www.ajc.state.ak.us/retention/faq (last visited Aug. 28, 2018). The 
council is not obligated to make recommendations, but it has always done so. 
 24.  ALASKA STAT. § 15.35.100 (2016). 
 25.  ALASKA CONST. art. IV, § 6. 
 26.  ALASKA STAT. § 15.35.053 (2016). 
 27.  ALASKA CONST. art. IV, § 6. 
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formally organized the Territory of Alaska—did not allow Alaska to 
create its own territorial courts.28 Thus, Alaska was, prior to statehood, 
under the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts.29 With no territorial 
infrastructure upon which to build Alaska’s judiciary, the Committee 
members looked to other states’ experiments with judicial systems to 
guide their drafting of Article IV, drawing upon nearly two centuries of 
state and federal experience in judicial selection.30 
The Committee members “did not want to experiment” with new, 
radical proposals to structure the judiciary in drafting Article IV.31 The 
Committee wanted to build upon a system “that had precedent and that 
worked.”32 Thus, the Committee examined already-functioning judicial 
selection systems to strike an appropriate balance between independence 
from the political branches and accountability to the people.33 Indeed, 
delegates to the Constitutional Convention were uniformly concerned 
that party politics or special interests might pollute Alaska’s judiciary.34 
Though the delegates overwhelmingly supported a system where judges 
were appointed, rather than elected, a small minority of delegates 
believed judicial elections were the best way to keep politics off the 
bench.35 Moreover, the delegates briefly debated having the governor or 
other elected representatives initially select the nominees, instead of a 
 
 28.  Act of Aug. 24, 1912, ch. 387, 37 Stat. 512. 
 29.  See JOHN S. WHITEHEAD, COMPLETING THE UNION 128 (2004) (“The 
[T]erritory [of Alaska] could not create its own territorial courts. Thus all 
territorial laws would be adjudicated in the existing federal courts.”). 
 30.  It is worth noting, however, that while Alaska’s judiciary mirrors merit-
based selection systems from other states, Alaska was actually the first state to 
adopt merit selection for all its courts. JED HANDELSMAN SHUGERMAN, THE PEOPLE’S 
COURTS: PURSUING JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN AMERICA 224 (Harvard Univ. Press 
2012). 
 31.  PACC, supra note 4, at 588 (statement of G. McLaughlin). While the 
Judiciary Committee was not formally or legally bound to any particular judicial 
model, the Alaska Bar Association’s Statehood Committee put forward its case for 
judicial independence when it called for a convention, citing a merit-based 
selection system as a model. Thomas B. Stewart, A Model Judiciary for the 49th State, 
42 J. AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y 52 (1958); SHUGERMAN, supra note 30, at 224. 
 32.  SHUGERMAN, supra note 30, at 224. 
 33.  See VICTOR FISCHER, ALASKA’S CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 113–16 
(1975). 
 34.  PACC, supra note 4, at 596 (statement of R. Rivers) (“All agree that the 
first step is to find the right method of selecting judges which will insure a bench 
free from the influence and control of party politics, individuals or pressure 
groups.”); PACC, supra note 4, at 598 (statement of E. Davis) (“[W]ithout 
qualification, I believe I could say that all of us here want an independent 
judiciary, a judiciary that will not be swayed by the public will at any particular 
moment, a judiciary that will not be subject to political pressure, a judiciary that 
will not be subject to pressure from the executive branch of the government.”). 
 35.  PACC, supra note 4, at 597 (statement of E. Davis). 
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judicial council performing that function.36 How the delegates navigated 
this disagreement and arrived at the merit selection process is explored in 
detail below. 
A. Debates at the Constitutional Convention 
How the delegates came to design the merit selection process can be 
divided into two questions. First, why did the delegates choose 
appointment over election? And second, why did the delegates task a 
judicial council with sending a list of candidates to the governor, instead 
of allowing the governor to initially select the candidates? These 
questions are answered by the delegates’ desire to establish a judiciary 
“independen[t] from the executive and legislative branches”—a judiciary 
removed from the tumult and vicissitudes of politics.37 
1. Appointment Versus Election 
 
The Judiciary Committee first looked to experienced professionals in 
the legal community when weighing an appointment system against an 
election system.38 They quickly agreed to follow principles suggested by 
the American Bar Association and other professional civic groups, which 
heavily favored appointment.39 Moreover, before presenting a draft of the 
article to the entire Convention for debate, Committee Chairman George 
McLaughlin sought advice and comment from the Alaska Bar 
Association, federal district court judges, the U.S. Attorney for the 
Territory of Alaska, and the United States Commissioner in Alaska.40 This 
 
 36.  See, e.g., About the Commission on Judicial Appointments, CAL. CTS. 
http://www.courts.ca.gov/5367.htm (last visited Aug. 28, 2018) (describing 
California’s process for filling a vacancy in either the state supreme court or court 
of appeals, where justices are appointed by the governor and the Commission on 
Judicial Appointments possesses the ultimate discretion in confirming those 
appointments). 
 37.  FISCHER, supra note 33, at 113. 
 38.  Id. at 269–75. The Committee’s makeup—five lawyers and two non-
lawyers—may partially explain its determination that the views of experienced 
professionals in the legal community were entitled to weight. Id. At the same time, 
less than twenty-five percent of the convention delegates (thirteen of fifty-five) 
were lawyers. Id. 
 39.  FISCHER, supra note 33, at 113. The American Bar Association and 
American Judicature Society both formally endorsed in the late 1930s a 
commission-based appointment system that became the basis for the merit 
selection system Alaska has today. See Glenn R. Winters, The Merit Plan for Judicial 
Selection and Tenure: Its Historical Development, in SELECTED READINGS: JUDICIAL 
SELECTION AND TENURE, 29, 37 (Glenn R. Winters ed., rev. ed. 1973); see also 
SHUGERMAN, supra note 30 at 202–05 (exploring the historical roots of commission-
based appointment systems in the United States). 
 40.  FISCHER, supra note 33, at 114. 
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process led to many endorsements of the appointment system, including 
one from the Board of Governors of the Alaska Bar Association.41 
Ultimately, Chairman McLaughlin and the rest of the Committee 
presented to the entire Convention a judiciary article that included a non-
partisan plan for selecting judges that would “make judges responsible to 
the people without subjecting them to the partisan politics or competitive 
campaigns for election or re-election.”42 
The proposed judiciary article included a merit-based appointment 
system first adopted by Missouri in the 1940s.43 Under the Missouri Plan, 
judges were initially appointed by the governor, who selected from a list 
of three nominees recommended by a judicial commission.44 At the first 
general election following the judge’s first year on the bench, he or she 
would face the voters in a retention election.45 Judges who received 
affirmative votes in this uncontested retention election of a majority of the 
votes cast earned a full six-year term in office if a trial judge or a twelve-
year term if an appellate judge.46 While substantially similar to the 
Missouri Plan, Alaska’s judicial selection system allows more time—at 
least three years for most judges47—between a judge’s initial appointment 
to the bench and the first retention election. 
Delegates at the Convention almost uniformly preferred an 
appointment system to judicial elections,48 though there was a small, 
vocal minority advocating for the latter.49 Broadly speaking, the delegates 
preferred appointment because they feared that judicial elections would 
make the judiciary less independent and would potentially lead judges to 
decide cases based, at least in part, on political considerations.50 The 
 
 41.  Id. 
 42.  Id. 
 43.  See Norman Krivosha, In Celebration of the 50th Anniversary of Merit 
Selection, 74 J. AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y 128, 131 (1990). California in 1934 became the 
first state to adopt an appointment system that considered input from the state’s 
community of lawyers and judges. Id. But Missouri was the first state to 
implement a system in which a council or committee of attorneys made the initial 
selection of judicial candidates. Id; see also Hon. Jay A. Daugherty, The Missouri 
Non-Partisan Court Plan: a Dinosaur on the Edge of Extinction or a Survivor in a 
Changing Socio-Legal Environment?, 62 MO. L. REV. 315, 319 (1997). 
 44.  Daugherty, supra note 43, at 319. 
 45.  Id. 
 46.  Id; see also MO. CONST. art. V, § 25(c)(1). 
 47.  For district court judges, the period is at least two years. ALASKA STAT. § 
15.35.100 (2016). 
 48.  FISCHER, supra note 33, at 115. 
 49.  Id. (explaining that Robert McNealy, a delegate from Fairbanks, proposed 
an amendment to the judiciary article that would have substituted judicial 
elections for the Missouri Plan). 
 50.  See SHUGERMAN, supra note 30, at 224–25 (“Alaskan voters were solidly 
Democratic [in the 1950s], and, at the time, Eisenhower was president and 
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delegates to the Convention were concerned that elections would force 
judges to take into account the political effects of their decisions and 
modify those decisions accordingly. As McLaughlin put it, judges who 
were worried about election results would be constantly “peering over 
[their] shoulders to see if [their] decisions were popular.”51 Second, the 
delegates were concerned that litigants might not have their claims 
adjudicated fairly before an elected judiciary.52 
These concerns steered the delegates away from judicial elections. 
But the delegates still desired some degree of popular control over the 
composition of the bench and believed that “[t]he popular will should be 
expressed even in the control of the judiciary.”53 Thus, the Committee 
ultimately decided that judges’ names should be placed before the people 
on a nonpartisan ballot “at the first general election held more than three 
years after his appointment.”54 This compromise was, in the eyes of 
Chairman McLaughlin, “the best solution to a vexing problem between 
those who feel we should have lifetime tenure so the judges can be 
absolutely independent or whether we should have short terms so the 
judges could be subject to popular will.”55 
McLaughlin was not willing, however, to endorse the Missouri 
Plan’s short period of time between the initial appointment of a judge and 
the first retention election.56 Echoing his earlier concern that elected 
judges may be constantly “looking over their shoulder”57 to gauge the 
popularity of their decisions, McLaughlin explained, 
the only way we could assure the attraction of good candidates 
was to assure them they would be in office at least for a period 
of three and one-half years. Why is that necessary? Because after 
a year and one-half a judge might make a very unpopular 
decision, and he would not be able to overcome that in terms of 
popular resentment, and he might be forced out of office after a 
year and one-half.58 
McLaughlin believed that holding retention elections a minimum of 
three years after appointment would capture the benefits of an 
 
Republicans controlled the Senate . . . . Alaskan leaders understood that 
nonpartisan appointment was a public statement to a national audience and to 
Republicans that Alaskans intended to govern responsibly with 
nonpartisanship.”). 
 51.  PACC, supra note 4, at 584 (statement of G. McLaughlin). 
 52.  Id. at 601 (statement of L. Barr). 
 53.  Id. at 586 (statement of G. McLaughlin). 
 54.  ALASKA CONST. art. IV § 6. 
 55.  PACC, supra note 4, at 601 (statement of G. McLaughlin). 
 56.  Id. 
 57.  Id. at 584 (statement of G. McLaughlin). 
 58.  Id. at 586. 
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independent judiciary while still allowing the people to have their say in 
who gets to be a judge.59 
Committee members also believed the Missouri Plan would produce 
the most well-qualified candidates for the bench. Ketchikan delegate 
Walter Smith, for example, thought that while “political implications 
would be equal” in either an appointment or elective system, “under an 
elective system a man is elected on his personal charm or his popularity 
and quite often his qualifications are not closely examined.”60 Fairbanks 
delegate Ralph Rivers echoed Smith’s belief, arguing that elections would 
turn away otherwise qualified candidates for judgeships because they 
would hesitate to join the “political circus” of judicial elections.61 
McLaughlin also concurred with Smith and emphasized that the 
attorneys on the Judicial Council would assure the most-qualified 
candidates are sent to the governor for final approval.62 
The appointment system was not without its detractors. Fairbanks 
delegate and attorney Robert McNealy strongly preferred an election 
system to appointment. He believed that the latter fomented “much 
greater political interference and corruption.”63 McNealy, who had lived 
in Alaska nearly 20 years at the time of the Convention, expressed his 
personal frustration with an appointment system, stating that “Being an 
attorney, I know the background of the appointment system of judges. 
Being an Alaskan I have lived under the appointment system so long that 
I feel that I should have the right to vote for these judges.”64  McNealy’s 
substantive arguments, however, are somewhat difficult to decipher 
because he often advocated his positions by articulating long and, at 
times, confusing hypotheticals rather than stating his arguments 
directly.65 
 
 59.  At least one legal scholar has argued that retention elections soon after 
appointment are undesirable. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Evaluating Judicial 
Candidates, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1985, 1989 (1988) (“Another problem that needs to be 
addressed has to do with the frequency of retention elections in California. 
Although judges have twelve-year terms in California, they face retention 
elections in the first general election after their appointment.”). 
 60.  PACC, supra note 4, at 589 (statement of W. Smith). 
 61.  Id. at 593–94 (statement of R. Rivers). 
 62.  Id. at 687 (statement of G. McLaughlin). 
 63.  FISCHER, supra note 33, at 115. 
 64.  PACC, supra note 4, at 583 (statement of R. McNealy). 
 65.  See discussion infra Section II.A.2; see also PACC, supra note 4, at 592 (using 
the fictional “Judge Whoozit” in a hypothetical wherein lawyers in Alaska band 
together in an attempt to discredit a deficient judge—McNealy was using this 
hypothetical to claim that the general public would not be swayed by such an 
attempt because “Judge Whoozit” would be able to convince them that the 
lawyers were trying to sabotage him). 
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A careful dissection of McNealy’s Convention speeches reveals two 
principled concerns with merit-selection: (1) Absent a political opponent, 
judges adept in political communication and self-promotion will always 
win their retention elections. Thus, even deficient judges will remain on 
the bench indefinitely. (2) Members of an appointed Judicial Council will 
be necessarily beholden to the political interests of the body that 
appointed them.66 The lay members of the Council will be an arm of the 
governor, whereas the three attorney members will reflect the wishes of 
the Alaska Bar Association because “lawyers have politics, too.”67 As an 
examination of subsequent history reveals, neither argument has proven 
correct.68 
McNealy’s first argument was premised on the belief that “the 
general public does not pay too much attention to judges and what is 
going on in court unless it is your case before the court.”69 He went on to 
say that if a judge issued poor decisions, then that judge would still win 
any retention election because the judge would only have to run against 
his or her record—as opposed to an opponent—and the only people 
voting against that judge would be legal professionals with the time and 
education to understand why the judge’s decisions were deficient.70 
This argument is not entirely without theoretical merit. Many 
scholars—some in Alaska—argue that retention elections encourage a 
“yes” vote because the judge has the advantage of incumbency and voters 
do not have an alternative judicial candidate to support.71 Indeed, 
acknowledging that the public may have difficulty in assessing a judge’s 
 
 66.  See PACC, supra note 4, at 590–93 (statement of R. McNealy). 
 67.  PACC, supra note 4, at 2884 (statement of R. McNealy); see also 
SHUGERMAN, supra note 30, at 226 (“One theory suggests that merit selection was 
the product of powerful state bar associations, but this theory certainly does not 
apply to Alaska. The Alaska bar did not even exist in any organized way until the 
state constitutional convention was announced.”). 
 68.  As to the notion that opposition by the organized bar would guarantee 
that a judge up for retention would win, see supra note 65. As to the notion that 
appointees would always reflect the views of the entity that appointed them, and 
that 3-3 votes would routinely result, see infra note 73. 
 69.  PACC, supra note 4, at 591 (statement of R. McNealy). 
 70.  See id. 
 71.  See GORDON HARRISON, ALASKA LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS AGENCY, ALASKA’S 
CONSTITUTION: A CITIZEN’S GUIDE 98 (5th ed. 2012), available at 
https://www.commerce.alaska.gov/web/Portals/4/pub/AK%20CONSTITUTI
ON-Citizens%27%20Guide.pdf; Chris W. Bonneau, Electoral Verdicts: Incumbent 
Defeats in State Supreme Court Elections, 33 AM. POL. RES. 818 (2005); THOMAS 
MOREHOUSE AND GERALD MCBEATH, ALASKA POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT 200 (Univ. 
of Neb. Press 1994) (“The removal of only a handful of judges typically occurs 
with the kind of retention election Alaska uses. The elections do not present voters 
with a choice between candidates. If a judge is not retained, the people have little 
say about the replacement. Foes of a certain judge must be organized and well-
funded to mobilize opposition among the electorate.”). 
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performance (and mindful of a judge’s vulnerability to last-minute smear 
campaigns) without readily-accessible evaluative data, the Alaska State 
Legislature in 1975 directed the Judicial Council to evaluate judges 
standing for retention elections and publish the results prior to the 
election.72 And while several judges have been retained by the voters 
despite a non-retention recommendation by the Council, all but one judge 
rejected by the voters after 1975 received a non-retention 
recommendation from the Council.73 
McNealy’s second argument was that Council members would be 
mere pawns of the entity that appointed them: lay persons on the Judicial 
Council appointed by the governor would, according to McNealy, merely 
be instruments of the governor’s political party and lawyers would 
represent only the Bar.74 McNealy also suggested that such a deadlock 
could block formation of the Council itself if agreement on nominees for 
chief justice could not be reached.75 Of course, this argument loses its force 
 
 72.  ALASKA STAT. § 15.58.050 (2016) (“. . .the Judicial Council shall file with 
the lieutenant governor a statement including information about each supreme 
court justice, court of appeals judge, superior court judge, and district court judge 
who will be subject to a retention election. The statement shall reflect the 
evaluation of each justice or judge conducted by the Judicial Council according to 
law and shall contain a brief statement describing each public reprimand, public 
censure, or suspension received by the judge. . . .”); HARRISON, supra note 71, at 
101 (“To evaluate the fitness of judges for retention, the Council surveys attorneys, 
police officers, probation officers, jurors, social workers, and court employees; it 
studies decisions of the judge and pertinent court records; and it solicits citizens’ 
opinions through public hearings and other means. The Council must publicize 
the results of its evaluations at least 60 days before the retention election. It does 
so by publishing them in newspapers around the state and in the official election 
pamphlet distributed to voters by the division of elections.”). 
 73.   See ALASKA JUDICIAL COUNCIL, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS, 
http://www.ajc.state.ak.us/retention/faq (last visited Aug. 28, 2018) (“Since 
1976, the Judicial Council has recommended against a judge’s retention twelve 
times.”); see also ALASKA JUD. COUNCIL, 1976-2016 RETENTION VOTE HISTORY (2016), 
available at http://www.ajc.state.ak.us/sites/default/files/imported/retention/ 
retvotes16.pdf (showing two judges were removed in 1982, one in 2006, and one 
in 2010). As this article was being finalized for publication, Anchorage Superior 
Court Judge Michael Corey lost his 2018 retention election despite receiving a 
recommendation from the Judicial Council that he be retained. Michelle Theriault 
Boots, Voters Oust Anchorage Judge Targeted for Role in Controversial Plea Agreement, 
ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS (Nov. 6, 2018), https://www.adn.com/alaska-
news/2018/11/06/anchorage-judge-targeted-for-role-in-controversial-plea-
agreement-trailing/. Corey was the target of a grassroots campaign to remove 
him from the bench after he accepted a controversial plea agreement. Id. This was 
the first time in Alaska’s history that a judge lost his or her retention election after 
receiving a positive recommendation from the Council, and it was also the first 
time a judge was voted off the bench in response to public outrage over a specific 
judicial decision. Id. 
 74.  See PACC, supra note 4, at 592 (statement of R. McNealy). 
 75.  See id. at 592–93. 
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when considering that, once the first Chief Justice of the Alaska Supreme 
Court was appointed, the chief would serve as an ex-officio member of the 
Council and be able to provide the tie-breaking vote. Delegate Ralph 
Rivers pointed out as much during the Convention: 
There is the other point that there will only be six until a supreme 
court justice is appointed and the only chance for a deadlock 
would be on nominating two or three people for the office of 
supreme court justice. After that you have your seventh member 
and there will be no chance of a deadlock. I am willing to trust 
the integrity and good sense of the six people first appointed to 
judicial council to be able to agree on two or three nominations 
for chief justice, and I am willing to trust the governor to take his 
choice of those two or three names that are presented, so I see no 
serious problem of a deadlock in order to get the machinery fully 
implemented.76 
McNealy was unable to persuade more than a handful of delegates 
at the Convention to support an election system. After the proposed 
Judiciary Article’s first reading, the modified Missouri Plan passed by a 
fifty-one to two vote.77 W.W. Laws was the only delegate to join 
McNealy’s protest.78 He did so without joining the debate. McNealy again 
opposed the Article IV proposal in its third reading.79 His arguments 
remained largely the same.80 McNealy saw the lay members and attorneys 
on the Judicial Council as pawns in a political chess match between the 
Alaska Bar Association and the governor.81 And the Chief Justice of the 
Alaska Supreme Court would be the proverbial queen: if the governor 
“can control the chief justice and the three laymen, he makes all the 
appointments; if the bar association can control the chief justice and the 
three lawyers on this Judicial Council, they are going to make all the 
appointments.”82 This argument was able to win over a few converts to 
 
 76.  PACC, supra note 4, at  594 (statement of R. Rivers). 
 77.  PACC, supra note 4, at  610 (vote roll call). 
 78.  FISCHER, supra note 33, at 115. 
 79.  Id. 
 80.  See id; PACC, supra note 4, at 2882-84 (statement of R. McNealy). 
 81.  PACC, supra note 4, at 2884. 
 82.  PACC, supra note 4, at  2884 (statement of R. McNealy). 
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McNealy’s corner, though his fight was ultimately futile.83 The final 
Judiciary Article was approved by a vote of forty-seven to six.84 
2. Appointment by the Judicial Council Versus Political Appointment 
 
The delegates to Alaska’s Constitutional Convention were uniformly 
skeptical of the governor’s role in appointing judges.85 Chairman 
McLaughlin pointed to California as a state that suffered from a broken 
judicial system precisely because the California judicial commission 
would consider candidates only if they had already been selected by the 
governor.86 He stated at the Convention that “there was a tendency [in 
California] on the part of the governor to always pick men of his own 
political party . . . [and] just present [the Council] with a long line of 
Democrats or a long line of Republicans.”87 Thus, McLaughlin was 
concerned that even if the governor was unable to appoint the individual 
judges he or she wanted, they could at least ensure that any newly-
appointed judge carried the banner of the governor’s party. 
McNealy was also skeptical of allowing the governor to appoint 
judges.88 As mentioned above, McNealy was against any appointment 
system—he preferred elections.89 He seemed especially concerned, 
however, about the governor’s political motivations in selecting judges.90 
When he realized that, no matter how much he protested, the Council 
would be a feature of Alaska’s judiciary, McNealy admitted that “in my 
opinion four lawyers should be able to control this judicial council.”91 
McNealy, however, did not consider the ex-officio membership of the chief 
 
 83.  Moreover, the 60-year history of the Council has definitively consigned 
McNealy’s speculation to the dustbin: Of 1,344 Council votes on judicial selection 
since 1984, when detailed records have been kept, there have been only 73 ties, 
requiring the chief justice to cast a vote. ALASKA JUDICIAL COUNCIL, DETAILS OF 
JUDICIAL NOMINATION VOTES 1984-2018 (2018) (on file with authors). Of those 73 
ties, the three attorneys and the three non-lawyers were on opposite sides of the 
vote only 18 times, or 1.3% of the total votes. Id. In those cases, the chief justice 
voted to forward the applicant in question to the governor nine  times, and to not 
forward the applicant nine times. Id. Of those 1,344 votes, the Council was 
unanimous on 876 votes, and unanimous but for one on 235 votes, for a total of 
82.6% unanimous or unanimous-but-for-one. Id. 
 84.  PACC,  supra note 4, at 2881–85 (statement of R. McNealy and vote roll 
call); see also FISCHER, supra note 33, at 115. 
 85.  See, e.g., PACC, supra note 4, at 584 (statement of G. McLaughlin). 
 86.  Id. 
 87.  Id. 
 88.  Id. at 583–84. 
 89.  Id. 
 90.  See id. at 585–86 
 91.  PACC, supra note 4, 2884 (statement of R. McNealy). 
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justice in his count, explaining that the “chief justice is going to owe his 
appointment to the governor.”92 
At least one delegate suggested skipping the governor altogether 
and having the Council send a list of nominees directly to the senate for 
approval.93 Ralph Rivers pointed out that, because the chief justice would 
preside over any attempt at impeaching the governor, it might be best to 
“submit the recommendation [from the Council] directly to the senate.”94 
Rivers explained that “there might be a conflict of interests if these 
supreme court judges were called to sit upon the trial of a man whom they 
had received their appointment from.”95 
The Committee “did consider the possibility” that the Council be 
allowed to send candidates directly to the senate for confirmation.96 But 
the Committee ultimately determined—at the “insistence” of either 
Thomas Harris or Irwin Metcalf, the two non-lawyers on the 
Committee—that such a system would be “too much of a closed 
corporation” and thus desired “some participation by the executive.”97 
Moreover, as mentioned above, McLaughlin was hesitant to experiment 
with novel, untested systems of judicial appointment.98 He argued that no 
conflict of interest between the chief justice and the governor had been 
identified in any state that followed some version of the Missouri Plan.99 
McLaughlin assured Rivers that the Committee had applied the best 
practices available by examining judicial systems throughout the country 
and, should problems arise, the people of Alaska “will attempt to solve 
them.”100 
3. The Convention Consultants’ Memorandum 
 
As a final historical note, it is worth mentioning the input from the 
Convention consultants.101 While the consultants agreed with the basic 
 
 92.  Id. 
 93.  Id. at 587–88 (statement of R. Rivers). 
 94.  Id. at 588 (statement of R. Rivers). 
 95.  Id. 
 96.  Id. at 588 (statement of G. McLaughlin). 
 97.  Id. 
 98.  Id. at 588–89 (statement of G. McLaughlin). 
 99.  Id. 
 100.  Id. 
 101.  A group of consultants—experts and academics in the fields of public 
administration and political science—assisted the various constitutional 
committees. FISCHER, supra note 33, at 41. Through these consultants, “delegates 
obtained the advice of the most widely recognized national authorities on state 
and local government and were able to learn first-hand about the problems that 
faced those states with older constitutions.” Id. Consultants to the Judiciary 
Committee included John Bebout, the Assistant Director of the National 
Municipal League; James Kimbraugh Owen, the Director of both the Public 
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objectives of the proposed judiciary article, they also stated in their 
memorandum that “[n]o state constitution has ever gone this far in 
placing one of the three coordinate branches of government beyond the 
reach of democratic controls.”102 The consultants suggested revisions that 
would, in their view, democratize the process and loosen the grasp of the 
Alaska Bar Association.103 These revisions included legislative 
confirmation of attorney members of the Judicial Council and adding a 
superior court judge and another lay member to the Council.104 
These suggestions, however, were never debated on the Convention 
floor.105 The Convention had an unwritten rule that the views of the 
consultants would not be cited during debate on the floor.106 The 
delegates followed this practice to avoid any public criticism that 
“outsiders” were writing the Alaska Constitution.107 If a consultant had a 
serious concern or disagreement with a committee or Convention action, 
he or she would typically communicate this concern to the committee 
chairman or meet privately with individual delegates.108 The consultants 
to the Judiciary Committee did, in fact, bring the above-stated concerns 
to George McLaughlin in the form of a memo.109 McLaughlin rejected 
these suggestions, however, and declined to raise them in any of the 
debates on the Convention floor.110 
III. CHALLENGES TO MERIT SELECTION 
Attempts to replace merit selection with different, more politicized, 
systems for selection of judges have periodically been made. For example, 
even though the Alaska Constitution requires the governor to appoint 
from the list of two or more nominees sent by the Judicial Council,111 and 
even though discussion at the Constitutional Convention made clear that 
 
Affairs Research Council of Louisiana and the Louisiana State Law Institute’s 
Constitutional Revision Project; and Emil J. Sady, the Resident Consultant of the 
Alaska Constitutional Convention and Senior Board Member of the Government 
Studies Division at the Brookings Institute. Id. 
 102.  FISCHER, supra note 33, at 116. 
 103.  Id. 
 104.  Id. 
 105.  Id. at 42. 
 106.  Id. 
 107.  Id. 
 108.  Id. 
 109.  Id. 
 110.  Id. 
 111.  ALASKA CONST., art. IV, § 5 (“The governor shall fill any vacancy . . . by 
appointing one of two or more persons nominated by the Judicial Council.” 
(emphasis added)). 
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the governor “has no other choice,”112 governors have at times threatened 
not to appoint from the list of those nominated by the Judicial Council, 
variously requesting or demanding more names, in effect attempting to 
bypass the first, merit-based, stage of the process.113  No such efforts have 
been successful. 
More seriously, litigants have challenged merit selection as violating 
the U.S. Constitution and state legislators have attempted to amend the 
Alaska Constitution to seriously weaken merit selection. To date, neither 
judicial nor legislative attacks have succeeded. But both lines of attack 
deserve careful consideration because of their potential to do real harm to 
the concept of merit selection. 
A. Litigation-based Challenges to Article IV 
In 2009, James Bopp, Jr., who would later be recognized as the 
architect of Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission,114 sued to 
invalidate Article IV on federal equal protection grounds.115 In Miller v. 
Carpeneti,116 the plaintiffs argued that Article IV’s reliance on attorney- 
 
 112.  See PACC, supra note 4, at 585 Id. (Statement of G. McLaughlin). As 
Chairman McLaughlin stated: “The governor is presented with two names, two 
or more names. . .  . The governor has no other choice, of the two names presented, 
he takes one, fills the vacancy in the court.” (Statement of G. McLaughlin). 
 113.  In probably the most serious case,  Gov. Frank Murkowski in 2004 wrote 
to the Judicial Council rejecting all nominees for a vacant superior court position 
in Anchorage.  Letter from Frank Murkowski, Governor of Alaska, to Larry Cohn, 
Exec. Dir., Alaska Judicial Council (Aug. 26, 2004) (on file with the Alaska Judicial 
Council) (“After careful consideration I have decided to reject the three candidates 
you have proposed.”); Sheila Toomey, Governor Nixes Judge Candidates, 
ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Aug. 31, 2004, at A1; see also Sheila Toomey, Rejection of 
Judge List Is “No Crisis”, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Sept. 3, 2004, at B1; Sheila 
Toomey, Judicial Council Given Ultimatum Over Bylaws, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, 
Sept. 4, 2004, at A1; Anchorage Daily News Staff, Murkowski Overreaches, 
ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Sept. 5, 2004, at H2; Kevin Clarkson, Truth Lies in Middle 
on Judge Selection, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Sept. 15, 2004, at B6; and following a 
meeting between the members of the Judicial Council and the governor’s chief of 
staff, the governor retreated from his original letter rejecting all nominees and 
appointed one of the nominees sent by the Council. Nicole Tsong, Judgeship 
Appointment Issue Still Alive in Court, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Jan. 29, 2005, at B2. 
 114. Bopp’s role in Citizens United has been chronicled widely in the press. See, 
e.g., Sarah Childress, James Bopp: What Citizens United Means for Campaign Finance, 
Frontline (Oct. 12, 2012), https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/james-
bopp-what-citizens-united-means-for-campaign-finance/ (referring to Bopp as 
“the intellectual architect behind Citizens United”). 
 115.  Miller v. Carpeneti, No. 3:09-CV-00136-JWS, 2009 WL 10695976, at *1 (D. 
Alaska Sept. 15, 2009). 
 116.  Id. 
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members of the Judicial Council violated the Equal Protection Clause of 
the U.S. Constitution because non-attorneys were denied the right to vote 
in the selection process for judges.117 
Relying on United States Supreme Court cases establishing the “one 
person, one vote” principle, and lower court decisions applying the 
principle to state and municipal elections, plaintiffs argued that the 
Alaska judicial selection process violated equal protection because of 
differences in the ways the participants in the process were themselves 
selected.118 That is, while the governor who appointed judges went before 
all the voters,119 and the legislators who confirmed the non-attorney 
members of the Judicial Council went before all the voters,120 and even 
the chief justice went before all the voters in his or her retention 
election,121 the attorney members of the Judicial Council obtained their 
positions through appointment by the Bar Association’s board of 
governors, themselves elected only by members of the Bar Association 
and not by all Alaska voters.122 
Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a 
cause of action, arguing that plaintiffs’ cases (and thus their theory) were 
inapposite primarily because Alaska’s constitutional scheme for judicial 
selection did not involve an election: “[P]laintiffs now contend that the 
constitutional selection process denies non-attorneys an equal right to 
vote for judges.  Plaintiffs’ claim fails principally because there is no 
election to select Alaska’s judges.”123 Defendants also argued that even if 
the merit selection process were elective in nature, one person, one vote 
does not apply to the judicial branch because judges do not represent the 
people.124 Alternatively, defendants argued that election to the Board of 
Governors fell within the limited purpose election exception to the one 
person, one vote rule.125 
The federal district court agreed with the defendants and granted the 
motion to dismiss.126 It began with the observation that “[o]f course, 
Alaska judges are not selected in an election. This forces plaintiffs to 
contend [one person, one vote] applies even where the state has chosen to 
 
 117.  Id. at *7–9. 
 118.  Id. at *8. 
 119.  Id. 
 120.  Id. 
 121.  Id. 
 122.  Id. 
 123.   Defendants’ Memorandum in Support of Motion To Dismiss at 2, Miller 
v. Carpeneti, No. 3:09-cv-00136-JWS, 2009 WL 10695976 (D. Alaska Sept. 15, 2009). 
 124.  Id. at *11. 
 125.  Id. at *19. 
 126.  See Miller v. Carpeneti, No. 3:09-CV-00136-JWS, 2009 WL 10695976 (D. 
Alaska Sept. 15, 2009). 
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select judges by appointment.”127 For this reason, the one person, one vote 
principle did not directly apply. 
The district court also rejected plaintiffs’ claim on the separate 
ground that one person, one vote did not apply to the election of the 
members of the Board of Governors “because the Board’s activities 
generally fall within the limited purpose exception.”128 It reached this 
conclusion because the Board exercised only narrow, limited 
governmental powers and it conducted activities that disproportionately 
affected only a specific group of individuals—here, lawyers.129 Because 
the Board was a limited purpose entity, the franchise could be 
constitutionally limited to lawyers, a group of individuals who are 
disproportionately affected, so long as the decision is reasonable and 
bears a rational relationship to a legitimate state interest. The court 
concluded that “[t]he Plan reflects the entirely rational proposition [that] 
lawyers have the experience and expertise needed to select Council 
members from among the ranks of Alaska’s lawyers. Furthermore, the 
interest in selecting qualified persons to serve on the Board is a 
legitimate—indeed very important—interest.”130 For these reasons the 
district court concluded that the election of lawyers to the Board of 
Governors passed constitutional muster.131 
Finally, the court reviewed whether the Board’s selection of the 
attorney members of the Judicial Council violated equal protection. It did 
not, the court held, because one person, one vote “does not apply where 
non-legislative officers are chosen by appointment, rather than by 
election.”132 Moreover, even if that principle applied, the Council itself is 
a limited purpose entity and it qualifies for the limited purpose exception 
to the one person, one vote principle.133 
Plaintiffs appealed the decision of the district court to the Ninth 
Circuit.134  That court affirmed in a unanimous decision which began by 
noting that “the district court correctly concluded [that] the right to equal 
voting participation has no application to the Judicial Council because the 
 
 127.  Id. at *1. 
 128.  Id. at *19. The limited purpose entity exception is based on the Supreme 
Court’s determination that the one person, one vote principle does not apply to 
the election of an entity that (1) exercises only limited governmental powers and 
(2) conducts activities that disproportionately affect only a specific group of 
individuals. E.g., Ball v. James, 451 U.S. 355, 364 (1981). 
 129.  Miller, 2009 WL 10695976, at *19. 
 130.  Id. at *20. 
 131.  Id. at *20–21. 
 132.  Id. at *21. 
 133.  Id. at *22. 
 134.  Kirk v. Carpeneti, 623 F.3d 889, 891 (9th Cir. 2010). 
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members of the Council are appointed, rather than elected.”135 The court 
then directly addressed plaintiffs’ “novel argument that all participants 
in Alaska’s judicial selection process must either be elected themselves, or 
be appointed by a popularly elected official.”136  Noting that plaintiffs’ 
sole support for that proposition was “thin,” the court nonetheless 
proceeded to address it comprehensively.137 
Plaintiffs relied on a footnote in Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 
15,138 in which a New York resident challenged a statute that limited 
voting in certain school board elections to property owners, leaseholders, 
and parents with children enrolled in the public schools. The Court struck 
down the statute in Kramer, applying strict scrutiny, because its 
restrictions impermissibly denied citizens with a legitimate interest in 
school affairs the right to vote in school board elections.139 In its analysis, 
the Court noted the difference between elective and appointive 
systems.140 In the latter, the Court stated that a voter had “indirect” 
influence over an appointment by virtue of voting for the appointing 
official: “Each resident’s formal influence is perhaps indirect, but it is 
equal to that of other residents.”141 But in an elective system, there was no 
influence exercised by those voters who were disqualified from voting.142 
Plaintiffs used the quoted footnote to argue that the appointment 
power must be limited to officials who have been elected.143 The Ninth 
Circuit directly rejected that theory: 
Plaintiffs attempt to characterize Kramer, and particularly the 
footnote 7 sentence referring to equal indirect influence in 
appointments, as holding that the Equal Protection Clause 
requires limiting the appointment power to officials who have 
been popularly elected. . . . The Kramer footnote does not stand 
for any such proposition. . . . The Court did not suggest a 
sweeping new constitutional rule that appointments for all 
positions in every branch of government must be made by an 
official who is popularly elected.144 
The court went on to note that fourteen states besides Alaska “give 
a significant role to attorneys in the merit selection process,” using 
 
 135.  Id. at 898. 
 136.  Id. 
 137.  Id. 
 138.  395 U.S. 621 (1969). 
 139.  Id. at 630–32. 
 140.  Id. at 627 n.7. 
 141.  Id. 
 142.  Id. 
 143.  Kirk, 623 F.3d at 907. 
 144.  Id. at 899. 
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nominating commissions that include attorney members who are neither 
popularly elected nor appointed by a popularly-elected official.145 And it 
pointed out that federal magistrate judges and federal bankruptcy judges 
are appointed after nomination by merit selection panels that are not 
popularly elected.146 
Having decided that the district court had properly resolved the 
constitutional issues raised by the case, the Ninth Circuit concluded its 
discussion with the observation that the pros and cons of the merit 
selection of judges, and the pros and cons of giving attorneys a role in that 
system, were discussed at the Alaska Constitutional Convention, and that 
the debate continues to this day.147 The court noted, “[t]he legal principle 
Plaintiffs ask the courts to establish is in fact a change in policy that 
requires amendment to the Alaska Constitution. To date, there is no 
indication of any desire on the part of Plaintiffs to invoke the amendment 
process.”148 That would soon change. 
B. Attempts to Amend Article IV 
In the 28th Alaska State Legislature, following the Ninth Circuit’s 
definitive rejection of plaintiffs’ attack on Article IV of the Alaska 
Constitution, and its observation that plaintiffs’ sole avenue for the 
change they sought was in the amendment process, Alaska State Senator 
Pete Kelly introduced Senate Joint Resolution 21 (SJR 21).149 SJR 21 sought 
to amend Article IV of the Alaska Constitution to accomplish the broad 
objectives of the earlier-failed litigation.150 
SJR 21 initially proposed a single change to Article IV that would 
dramatically alter the balance achieved by the founders. The even ratio 
(3:3) between non-attorneys and attorneys specified by the Constitution 
would be changed so that there would be twice as many non-attorneys as 
attorneys: the governor would appoint ten non-attorneys to the Judicial 
Council while the Board of Governors of the Alaska Bar Association 
would appoint five attorneys.151 SJR 21 was later amended so that the 
 
 145.  Id. at 900. 
 146.  Id. 
 147.  Id. 
 148.  Id. at 891. 
 149.  S.J. Res. 21, 28th Leg., 2d Sess. (Alaska 2014). 
 150.  The litigation sought to remove entirely the role of attorneys on the 
Judicial Council by disqualifying them from membership on the Council. Kirk v. 
Carpeneti, 623 F.3d 889, 891 (9th Cir. 2010). The proposed amendment, by 
comparison, sought to diminish substantially the attorneys’ role on the Council—
and concomitantly expand the governor’s power—by providing a much greater 
number of non-attorneys on the Council. 
 151.  S.J. Res. 21, 28th Leg., 2d Sess. (Alaska 2014). 
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number of attorneys would remain at three and the non-attorney 
members would increase from three to six.152 A second change was also 
proposed, prohibiting the attorney members of the Council from taking 
their seats until confirmed by the legislature.153 
SJR 21 was the subject of intense legislative debate. Proponents 
generally attacked what they claimed was the undue power exercised by 
attorneys in the selection process—some suggested that the lawyers could 
“dictate” who would go to the governor—pointing primarily to the fact 
that the three attorney members of the Council, plus the chief justice, 
constituted a “controlling majority” of the Council.154 And a recurrent 
theme was that the attorneys and chief combined to limit the number of 
names being sent to the governor.155 Opponents of the measure, however, 
provided testimony at several committee hearings, strongly rebutting the 
claim that attorneys exercised undue influence in the process,156 but were 
 
 152.  Comm. Substitute for S.J. Res. 21 (FIN), 28th Leg., 2d Sess. (Alaska 2014). 
 153.  Comm. Substitute for S.J. Res. 21 (2d FIN), 28th Leg., 2d Sess. (Alaska 
2014). 
 154.  A Resolution Proposing Amendments to the Constitution of the State of Alaska 
to Increase the Number of Members on the Judicial Council and Relating to the Initial 
Terms of New Members Appointed to the Judicial Council: Hearing on S.J. Res. 21 Before 
the S. Judiciary Comm., 28th Alaska Leg., 2d Sess. (Alaska 2014) (Statement of Sen. 
Kelly, Sponsor, at 1:58:44–2:00:30; Statement of William Clarke at 2:42:34). 
 155.  Id. (Statement of Sen. Kelly, at 1:59:00). 
 156.  Opponents presented the 2014 version of the chart adverted to in note 83, 
above. Nancy Meade, General Counsel of the Alaska Court System, introduced a 
chart entitled “Alaska Judicial Council, Voting Statistics—Applications for 
Judicial Positions.” A Resolution Proposing Amendments to the Constitution of the 
State of Alaska to Increase the Number of Members on the Judicial Council and Relating 
to the Initial Terms of New Members Appointed to the Judicial Council: Hearing on S.J. 
Res. 21 Before the S. Judiciary Comm., 28th Alaska Leg., 2d Sess. (Alaska 2014)  
(Statement of  Nancy Meade, General Counsel, Alaska Court System, at 2:15:08). 
 The situation regarding voting patterns in the Judicial Council has not changed 
in any material way since the legislative debates surrounding SJR 21 in 2014. In 
2014, as now, over 60% of Council votes are unanimous and over 80% are 
unanimous or unanimous except for one. ALASKA JUD. COUNCIL, DETAILS OF 
JUDICIAL NOMINATION VOTES 1984-2018 (Sept. 2, 2018) (on file with authors). Only 
1.3% of the votes are ties with all the attorneys on one side and the non-attorneys 
on the other. Id. In breaking those ties, the chief voted to send the applicant’s name 
to the governor nine times, and nine times not to send it on. Id. And in response 
to the repeated claim that the attorneys, including the chief justice, worked to limit 
the number of nominees sent to the governor, the opponents showed that, when 
the lawyers and non-lawyers were evenly split, the chief justice broke ties in favor 
of nominees exactly half of the time (in 9 of 18 cases). Id. And in the cases of all tie 
votes (that is, including instances where attorneys and non-attorneys were on 
both sides of the vote), the chief justice voted to send the name of the applicant to 
the governor 75% of the time. A Resolution Proposing Amendments to the Constitution 
of the State of Alaska to Increase the Number of Members on the Judicial Council and 
Relating to the Initial Terms of New Members Appointed to the Judicial Council: Hearing 
on S.J. Res. 21 Before the S. Judiciary Comm., 28th Alaska Leg., 2d Sess. (Alaska 2014) 
(Statement of Susanne diPietro at 2:17:42). 
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unsuccessful in stopping its advance through all committees of referral. 
But the really significant debates were largely within the membership of 
the Republican majority that controlled the Senate, and out of the public 
process. While successfully navigating all committees of referral,157 the 
resolution was eventually withdrawn by its sponsor before floor debate 
in the Senate,158 signaling that the resolution lacked sufficient support 
within the party to pass the full legislature.159 
The sponsors of SJR 21 introduced a virtually identical measure, 
Senate Joint Resolution 3 (SJR 3), in the following Alaska State 
Legislature.160 By this time, however, defenders of Article IV and the merit 
selection system had organized,161 and successfully stopped SJR 3 in 
committee.162 The proponents did not re-introduce any similar measures 
in the 30th Alaska Legislature. 
IV. EVALUATING MERIT-BASED SELECTION 
A. The Challenge of Judicial Evaluation 
It is difficult to quantify the practical benefits of a merit-based 
selection system. Evaluating different systems of judicial selection 
necessarily involves making a broader assessment about the role of the 
judicial branch in American government.163 Some commentators believe 
that judicial elections are desirable because they satisfy the demands of 
popular sovereignty,164 even if those elections produce judges who are 
 
 157.  S.J. Res. 21, Bill History, 28th Legislature, 2013/2014, available at 
www.akleg.gov (last visited Aug. 26, 2018) (passed Sen. Jud. Comm. 2/28/14; 
passed Sen. Fin. Comm. 3/31/14; advanced to third reading 4/4/14). 
 158.  S. JOURNAL, 28th Leg., 2d Sess., at 2431 (Alaska 2014). 
 159.  Dermot Cole, Fischer, Carpeneti Defend Judge Selection System at State Bar 
Convention, ALASKA DISPATCHNEWS (May 13, 2015), https://www.adn.com 
/politics/article/fischer-carpeneti-discuss-judge-selection-state-bar-
convention/2015/05/14/ (“Kelly introduced [SJR 21] in 2014, but could not line 
up 14 votes in the senate to advance the plan, as Fairbanks Republican Sen. Click 
Bishop opposed it at a key moment.”). 
 160.  S.J. Res. 3, 29th Leg., 1st Sess. (Alaska 2015). 
 161.  The opponents of SJR 21 later created a non-profit group called Justice 
Not Politics Alaska to defend Art. IV and the merit selection system. About Us, 
JUSTICE NOT POLITICS ALASKA, http://justicenotpoliticsalaska.org/pages/about-
us/ (last visited Oct. 7, 2018). 
 162.  See S. JOURNAL, 29th Leg., 1st Sess., at 584 (Alaska 2015) (representing the 
last recorded action regarding the resolution, which was referral to the senate 
judiciary committee). 
 163.  Laura Denvir Stith & Jeremy Root, The Missouri Nonpartisan Court Plan: 
The Least Political Method of Selecting High Quality Judges, 74 MO. L. REV. 711, 712 
(2009). 
 164.  See, e.g., Federalist Society Judicial Elections White Paper Task Force, The 
Case for Partisan Judicial Elections, 33 U. TOL. L. REV. 393, 394 (2002) 
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evaluated as less competent than appointed judges.165 Others argue that 
an independent judiciary—one without elections—is justified by 
reference to both the principles of American democracy and the 
demonstrable harms of electing judges.166 As to the former principle, an 
independent judiciary more closely aligns with the separation of powers 
fundamental to American constitutionalism.167 As Alexander Hamilton 
wrote in the Federalist No. 78, “the complete independence of the courts 
is peculiarly essential” in American governance.168 On a practical level, 
scholars have pointed out that popular control of the judiciary may 
compromise constitutional rights,169 lead to harsher sentences for criminal 
 
(“[J]udicial elections have substantial advantages over the alternatives not least in 
that they provide an additional, significant measure of self-government to 
voters.”); Ray M. Harding, The Case for Partisan Election of Judges, 55 A.B.A. J. 1162, 
1164 (1969) (“Query: Is it not our political system of elective representation that 
guarantees popular sovereignty? We have a tripartite system of government, the 
judiciary being but one branch of a system designed to insure that all branches of 
government will be responsible to the will of the governed.”). 
 165.  See generally Stephen Choi et al., Professionals or Politicians: The Uncertain 
Empirical Case for an Elected Rather than Appointed Judiciary, 26 J. L., ECON. & ORG. 
290, 308, 316 (2010) (pointing out that, when compared to elected judges, 
appointed judges are cited more often in other jurisdictions and are typically older 
and have more legal experience when they assume the bench). 
 166.  See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Evaluating Judicial Candidates, 61 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 1985 (1988). 
 167.  See id. at 1988 (“The paramount function of courts is to protect social 
minorities and individual rights. But judges cannot be expected to perform this 
countermajoritarian function if their ability to keep their prestigious, highly 
sought after positions depends on popular approval of their ruling. . . . Thus, I 
strongly favor abolition of judicial elections in all states.”); see also Steven P. 
Croley, The Majoritarian Difficulty: Elective Judiciaries and the Rule of Law, 62 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 689, 726 (1995) (“[E]lective judiciaries pose two problems for the 
constitutional democrat. First, the rights of individuals and unpopular minority 
groups may be compromised by an elective judiciary. Second, and more mundane 
but no less important, the impartial administration of “day-to-day” justice may be 
compromised.”). 
 168.  THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 169.  See Croley, supra note 167, at 727 (“Insofar as the outcomes of judicial 
elections are dependent on majoritarian attitudes concerning individual or 
minority constitutional rights, these rights may be compromised.”); see also Julian 
N. Eule, Judicial Review of Direct Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. 1503, 1580 (1990) (“The 
independence demanded [of the judiciary] must insulate the courts from the 
people as well as the legislature.”). 
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defendants,170 and allow moneyed interests to infect the judicial arena.171 
Assessing merit-based judiciaries is further complicated in two 
ways. First, comparative studies of judicial selection methods usually rely 
on data collected from different states—where slight variations may exist 
between nominating systems despite their common denomination as 
“merit-based”—and each study uses a different method of data collection 
and analysis.172 Second, there are many different ways to evaluate judicial 
selection and retention using a variety of metrics, and each has its strong 
supporters.173 
With these considerations in mind, the success of Alaska’s merit-
based system can be assessed through quantitative studies that examine 
judicial selection, the historical presence or absence of corruption in state 
judicial systems, and qualitative assessments of Alaska’s judiciary by 
legal scholars and commentators. 
B. Studies on Merit-Based Selection 
Robust studies examining merit-based selection are few and far 
between.174 Two scholars at the University of Alaska Anchorage’s Justice 
 
 170.  See, e.g., KATE BERRY, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., HOW JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 
IMPACT CRIMINAL CASES 13 (2015); see also Stephen Bright & Patrick Keenan, Judges 
and the Politics of Death: Deciding between the Bill of Rights and the Next Election in 
Capital Cases, 1995 B.U. L.  REV. 793–95 (1995) (observing that judges who face 
retention elections are more likely to override jury sentences to impose death); 
Fred Burnside, Comment, Dying to Get Elected: A Challenge to the Jury Override, 1999 
WIS. L. REV. 1017, 1020 (1999) (examining political incentives leading judges to 
override jury sentences). 
 171.  Chemerinsky, supra note 166, at 1988 (“[P]ublic disclosure of campaign 
contributions means that judges can know who donated both money for and 
against them. There will be the inevitable suspicion that certain judicial votes were 
influenced by the dollars spent in the election campaign.”). 
 172.  Rebecca Mae Salokar et al., The New Politics of Judicial Selection in Florida: 
Merit Selection Redefined, 27 JUST. SYS. J. 123, 124 (2006); see also Ryan Fortson & 
Kristin S. Knudsen, A Survey of Studies on Judicial Selection, ALASKA JUST. FORUM, 
Summer/Fall 2015 at 1, 9 (“[E]ach state handles its judicial selection differently. 
This underscores the need to compare the different selection methods.”). 
 173.  See generally Erwin Chemerinsky, Ideology, Judicial Selection and Judicial 
Ethics, 2 GEO. J.  LEGAL ETHICS 643 (1989) (describing different methods of 
evaluating judges); see also Fortson & Knudsen, supra note 172. 
 174.  G. Alan Tarr, Commission-Based Judicial Appointment: The American 
Experience, 41 REVUE GENERALE DE DROIT 239, 263 (2011) (pointing out that both 
critics and proponents of merit-based selection have failed to develop a modern, 
comprehensive set of empirical research); see also Antonia Moras, A Look at Judicial 
Selection in Alaska, ALASKA JUST. F., Fall 2004, at 9, 11 (“Beyond the [Alaska Judicial] 
Council’s own research, little evaluation of the Alaska selection and retention 
processes has been done, and there seems to be a need for additional formal 
examination of their patterns and history to see how the framework has held up 
over the last four and a half decades.”); cf. Fortson & Knudsen, supra note 172, at 
10 (“There have been few empirical studies of selection method effects on trial 
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Center, Ryan Fortson and Kristin Knudsen, published a survey of studies 
on judicial selection in response to the Alaska legislature’s consideration 
of SJR 3 in 2015.175 These studies, according to the Justice Center, “are 
illustrative of the variety of approaches taken to evaluate the impact of 
selection methods on the quality of judicial performance.”176 Taken 
together, these studies highlight several desirable features of Alaska’s 
merit-based judicial selection process, as well as the potential dangers of 
modifying it.177 
Fortson & Knudsen first point to a study conducted by Salokar, et 
al.,178 which examined the effects of a 2001 Florida state law that gave the 
governor “substantially greater power in appointing members of 
[Florida’s] judicial nominating commissions”179 and “reduce[d] the 
influence of the state bar association.”180 The Salokar study is particularly 
probative for two reasons. First, the study examined both the composition 
of Florida’s judicial nomination commissions and the political orientation 
of individuals applying for and appointed to judgeships, rather than 
looking at just one or the other.181 Second, the Salokar study looked at 
these data before and after a change in Florida’s judicial selection system 
that was similar to the proposed Alaska constitutional amendment.182 
Florida has multiple judicial nomination commissions—one for each 
circuit and appellate court—resulting in twenty-six total commissions.183 
Before 2001, three commissioners had to be lawyers appointed by the 
Florida Bar Association; three commissioners were appointed by the 
governor (and could be lawyers or non-lawyers); and the remaining three 
commissioners had to be non-lawyers and were selected by the six other 
commissioners.184 Florida voters approved changing this system in 2001 
so that the governor appoints four members from a list of names 
submitted by the Florida Bar Association but can reject the list and ask for 
 
judges.”). 
 175.  See generally Fortson & Knudsen, supra note 172. 
 176.  Id. at 1. 
 177.  Fortson & Knudsen took no position on the desirability of Alaska’s merit-
based judicial selection process. They provided a number of studies but did not 
advocate for any particular judicial selection process. Thus, any advocacy that 
makes reference to Fortson & Knudsen comes from the authors of this article. 
 178.  Salokar et al., supra note 172. 
 179.  Forston & Knudsen, supra note 172, at 7. 
 180.  Salokar et al., supra note 172, at 123–24. 
 181.  Id. at 128, 130. 
 182.  Id. at 124. 
 183.  Id. at 125. 
 184.  Id. at 124–25. 
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a new one.185 The other five members are appointed entirely at the 
discretion of the governor, though at least two must be lawyers.186 
This change, according to Salokar, shifted Florida’s judicial selection 
process “away from the collaborative bar-governor process, which has 
been the hallmark of merit selection, to a system closer to a gubernatorial 
appointment process.”187 After 2001, both the commissions themselves, as 
well as the judges ultimately appointed to the bench, aligned more closely 
with the political party of the governor (Republican at the time).188 The 
commissioners selected under Florida’s new system are 
“overwhelmingly” Republican, accounting for 86.9 percent of overall 
appointees.189 This political alignment was true both of the applicants for 
the governor-appointed commission positions and of applicants 
recommended by the Florida Bar.190 Those appointed by the governor 
were nearly entirely Republican (98.2%) and none were Democrats.191 
Party affiliation bias also carried over to the judges selected.192 The 
number of judges registered as Republican increased from 61 percent to 
77 percent. Moreover, judicial applicants increasingly listed in their 
application prominent Republican politicians as personal references193 
and openly advertised their affiliation with Christian Right social 
organizations.194 
 Salokar’s study demonstrates that giving more power in the judicial 
selection process to politically elected leaders results in an increasingly 
politicized judiciary.195 As Fortson and Knudsen put it, “[i]f a hand-
picked screening committee assists the governor, it is reasonable to 
conclude that it will select nominees first for compatibility with the 
administration’s political, ideological, and religious views, then will 
narrow the pool based on merit and experience.”196 
 
 185.  Id. 
 186.  Id. at 126. 
 187.  Id. 
 188.  Id. at 128. 
 189.  Id. at 129. 
 190.  Id. 
 191.  Id. 
 192.  Id. at 134 (“The transformation was even more striking on the appellate 
courts. Before the reforms, only 54.5 percent of the governor’s eleven 
appointments to the district courts of appeals were Republicans, but following the 
reform, all nine (100 percent) were registered Republicans.”). 
 193.  Id. 
 194.  Id. at 138. Alaskan commentators expressed concern that modifying the 
Alaska Judicial Council to give the governor greater control over its composition 
would similarly inject religiosity into the bench. See, e.g., Barbara McDaniel, 
Secular Arguments to Change Judicial Council Mask Religious Agenda, ALASKA 
DISPATCH NEWS (Feb. 25, 2016). 
 195.  Id. at 138–39. 
 196.  Forston & Knudsen, supra note 172, at 9. 
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Beyond the Salokar study, there is very little research that analyzes 
changes in the composition of the judiciary in response to greater 
gubernatorial control over nominating commissions.197 Other papers 
analyzing judicial selection largely focus on the broader comparison of 
judicial election versus appointment.198 Nevertheless, studies that 
highlight the differences between election and appointment are helpful 
when evaluating Alaska’s merit-based system as they serve as proxies for 
comparing more- and less-independent judicial systems. 
Studies comparing appointment and election systems indicate that 
both citizens199 and corporate litigants200 report high satisfaction in 
jurisdictions that have appointment systems. Voter satisfaction with 
judges may be reflected in the vote in judicial retention elections.201 In the 
2016 retention elections—the most recent for which full statistics are 
available at the time this article was written—33 judges were up for 
retention.202 Alaska voters retained all 33, with the percent voting to retain 
ranging between 57.5 percent and 75 percent.203 At least one commentator 
has observed that “the vote in favor of retention [in Alaska] is typically 
between 60 and 75 percent of the total. This is evidence of the generally 
high caliber of Alaska’s judges.”204 Moreover, Alaska’s experience with 
retention elections is consistent with retention elections from other states. 
A 2007 study of retention elections in ten states showed the mean 
percentage of affirmative votes for retention consistently in the high 60s 
to mid-70s.205 
 
 197.  See supra note 174 and accompanying text. 
 198.  See, e.g., Mattias Iaryczower, Garrett Lewis & Matthew Shum, To Elect or 
Appoint? Bias, Information, and Responsiveness of Bureaucrats and Politicians, J. PUB. 
ECON. 230 (2013). 
 199.  See HARRISON, supra note 71, at 98. (observing high affirmative vote 
percentages in Alaska’s judicial retention elections). 
 200.  UNITED STATES CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, RANKING 
THE STATES: A SURVEY OF THE FAIRNESS AND REASONABLENESS OF STATE LIABILITY 
SYSTEMS 20–21 (2017), https://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/uploads/pdfs/ 
Harris-2017-Executive-Summary-FINAL.pdf (ranking Alaska’s trial judges 
second in impartiality and fourteenth in competence according to a survey of 
corporate lawyers and executives). 
 201.  See Fortson & Knudsen, supra note 172, at 9 (“One possible measure of the 
success of the judicial selection process is through voter satisfaction with judges 
as reflected in the vote in judicial retention elections.”). 
 202.  ALASKA JUD. COUNCIL, 1976-2016 RETENTION VOTE HISTORY (2016), available 
at http://www.ajc.state.ak.us/sites/default/files/imported/retention/ 
retvotes16.pdf. 
 203.  Id. 
 204.  HARRISON, supra note 71, at 98. 
 205.  See Larry Aspin, Judicial Retention Election Trends 1964-2006, JUDICATURE, 
March–April 2007, at 208, 208–13; cf. Albert J. Klumpp, Alaska’s Judicial Retention 
Elections: A Comparative Analysis, 34 ALASKA L. REV. 143, 152 (2017) (noting that 
Alaska’s retention levels are historically lower than other retention states). 
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Measures of performance other than voter approval also highlight 
potential advantages of appointment systems. For example, judges in 
appointment systems are more-often cited by other courts and law 
reviews,206 suggesting that appointed judges author more persuasive 
opinions. And appointed judges are disciplined by judicial disciplinary 
councils less often than are elected judges,207 suggesting that appointed 
judges more closely adhere to norms of professional conduct while 
serving on the bench. 
C. Assessment of Merit Selection/Retention of Judges 
One way to assess the merit system for selection and retention of 
judges is to assess the functioning of the judicial system itself. If the 
system functions well, the system for selecting judges can be said to be a 
good one. While there are certainly other actors besides judges who affect 
the overall functioning of the judicial system, responsibility in Alaska for 
its performance rests primarily with judicial officers, as administrative 
direction of the Alaska Court System is vested in the chief justice.208 
Moreover, appointment of the administrative director to supervise the 
administrative operations of the judicial system, who serves at the 
pleasure of the chief justice, is done only with the approval of the Alaska 
Supreme Court.209 Beyond these administrative responsibilities, of course, 
it is judges, at all levels, who make the decisions upon which the judgment 
of the effectiveness of the judicial system largely depends. 
We conclude that the Alaska judicial system has functioned 
extremely well during its 60-year history. We reach this conclusion based 
on two complementary analyses. First, the absence of historical evidence 
of corruption or malfeasance in the history of the Alaska judiciary. 
Second, the judgments of several legal professionals from across a broad 





 206.  See Choi et al., supra note 165, at 315 (“Our results are largely consistent 
with the hypothesis that judges subject to less partisan pressure write higher 
quality—more frequently cited—opinions.”). 
 207.  MALIA REDICK, AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y, JUDGING THE QUALITY OF JUDICIAL 
SELECTION METHODS: MERIT SELECTION, ELECTIONS, AND JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE 5–6 
(2010), available at http://www.judicialselection.us/uploads/documents/ 
Judging_the_Quality_of_Judicial_Sel_8EF0DC3806ED8.pdf. 
 208.  ALASKA CONST. art. IV, § 16. 
 209.  Id. 
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1. Absence of Corruption 
 
In contrast to the unhappy experiences of many other states,210 the 
Alaska judiciary has, during its 60-year history, avoided corruption and 
scandal. A review of Alaska’s history since statehood reveals no example 
of judicial corruption: no bribery, no payoffs, no other scandals. As 
Thomas B. Stewart, the Secretary of the Constitutional Convention and a 
primary architect of the Constitution, wrote in 2004: 
Alaska is fortunate to have the constitutional guarantee of the 
merit system for the selection of judges. Our merit system has 
worked well in Alaska. It has produced high quality judges with 
integrity and abundant skills, and it has kept out corrupting 
political influences that trouble other states.211 
 
 Ten former Alaska attorneys general, who had been appointed 
by governors from across the political spectrum, highlighted the 
absence of corruption in the history of the Alaska judiciary in urging 
the legislature to reject SJR 3. They wrote: “Almost uniquely among 
the states, Alaska’s judiciary has been free of the taint of corruption 
and scandal that has plagued so many other state judiciaries.”212 
Editorial comment has also noted the absence of problems 
encountered elsewhere. During debate on the issue whether the governor 
had the right to demand more nominees from the Judicial Council, the 
Anchorage Daily News defended the merit system in these terms: “The 
wisdom of the constitutional framers has been demonstrated again and 
again. The system works. . . . Neither partisanship nor cronyism nor 
political pandering has ever gotten a firm grip on Alaska courts . . . .”213 
Charlie Cole, Attorney General of Alaska from 1991 to 1994, wrote 
in opposition to SJR 21 in 2014, that popular election or partisan 
appointment systems in other states had “too often created judiciaries 
 
 210.  See generally Geoffrey P. Miller, Bad Judges, 83 TEX. L. REV. 431 (2004) 
(documenting hundreds of instances of judicial misconduct); CYNTHIA GRAY, AM. 
JUDICATURE SOC’Y, A STUDY OF STATE JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE SANCTIONS 167  (2002), 
available at https://www.ncsc.org/~/media/Files/PDF/Topics/Center% 
20for%20Judicial%20Ethics/Publications/Study-of-State-Judicial-Discipline-
Sanctions.ashx (pointing to hundreds of instances of judicial misconduct in the 
United States, but only two in Alaska). 
 211.  Thomas B. Stewart, Judicial Merit System Best for Alaskans, ANCHORAGE 
DAILY NEWS, Sept. 26, 2004, at F2. 
 212.  Letter from Ten Former Alaska Attorneys General to Alaska legislators 
(Dec. 8, 2015), http://justicenotpoliticsalaska.org/uploads/3/7/6/8/37689611 
/letter_from_former_alaska_attorneys_general.pdf. 
 213.  Editorial, Murkowski Overreaches, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Sept. 5, 2004, 
at H2. 
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tainted by corruption, cronyism, bias, and mediocrity, if not outright 
incompetence.”214 
2. Professional Assessment 
 
The judgments of others, especially legal professionals from both 
outside and inside Alaska, lend strong support to the conclusion that 
merit selection has created a highly functioning judicial system. 
Dean Erwin Chemerinsky, who has reviewed all of the opinions of 
the Alaska Supreme Court and the Alaska Court of Appeals each year 
since 2003, and who has addressed the combined Alaska Bar and bench 
at their yearly conference since 1990 on Alaska constitutional opinions, 
had this to say recently about the experience: 
It is an enormous pleasure each year to read all the Alaska 
published opinions so as to go through this process. As I say 
each year, I come away from that experience absolutely 
convinced that in Alaska you have the very best appellate judges 
of any state in the country.215 
Dean Chemerinsky has also expressed this sentiment to a broader 
audience. In his 2014 book The Case Against the Supreme Court, Dean 
Chemerinsky wrote that Alaska’s system “has truly been a merit-selection 
process and has produced courts with excellent judges.”216 He stated 
further that “the Alaska Judicial Council sees its task as identifying those 
who will be outstanding judges, without regard to their political party or 
ideology,”217 and praised the “high quality” of judicial opinions issued by 
the Alaska Supreme Court and the Alaska Court of Appeals.218 After 
briefly comparing Alaska’s judicial selection process with those found in 
other states, Chemerinsky concluded that “the best selection process is 
one that truly emphasized merit, and Alaska’s has succeeded in this 
regard.”219 
When the question of Alaska’s merit selection system was debated 
broadly in 2015 with the introduction of SJR 3, ten of Alaska’s former 
 
 214.  Charlie Cole, Opinion, Stacking Alaska Judicial Council Would Be a Mistake, 
ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS (Mar. 12, 2014), https://www.adn.com/commentary/ 
article/compass-stacking-alaska-judicial-council-would-be mistake/2014 
/03/13/. 
 215.  Videotape: Erwin Chemerinsky, Alaska Appellate Law Update, Address 
at the Alaska Bar Convention (May 23, 2016) (on file with the Alaska Bar 
Association). 
 216.  ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, THE CASE AGAINST THE SUPREME COURT 299–300 
(2014). 
 217.  Id. at 299. 
 218.  Id. at 298. 
 219.  Id. at 300. 
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attorneys general, from across the political spectrum, spoke out sharply 
against modifying Article IV. The former attorneys general jointly signed 
an open letter to the Alaska Legislature that began by noting their 
common perspective: 
Each of us has served as Alaska Attorney General. Having seen 
our judiciary system up close, we are deeply concerned by recent 
efforts to amend the Alaska Constitution in a way that would 
introduce politics into the selection of Alaska’s judges. We 
oppose Senate Joint Resolution 3, presently pending before the 
Senate, because it would weaken one of the best judicial 
selection and retention systems in America.220 
The former attorneys general emphasized their agreement on the 
excellence of Alaska’s merit selection system despite their broad 
differences in background and service: 
We served Republican and Democratic governors who came 
from all segments of the political spectrum. But we agree that 
our Constitutional framers got it right when they created a merit 
selection system that ensures that only the most qualified 
judicial applicants—the “tallest timber”—will be nominated for 
the governor to consider appointing to the bench.221 
They concluded their open letter to the legislature with a clear call to reject 
the attempt to amend Article IV: “The Alaska Constitution’s Judiciary 
Article has served the state well and should not be amended. Please reject 
SJR 3.”222 
Even those who have advocated for changing Alaska’s Constitution 
have expressed a desire to leave the merit-based selection system intact. 
Former Alaska Attorney General John Havelock, who has urged the 
convening of a Constitutional Convention to address what he perceives 
as weaknesses in the Alaska Constitution, commented that “the Judicial 
Article . . . was a triumph of reason at the [C]onstitutional [C]onvention 
and has served this state well.”223 Concerning the balance struck by the 
framers regarding judicial selection, Havelock concluded that “there 
seems to be no compelling reason” to change the balance of power 
between the governor and the Judicial Council.”224 He added that “[t]he 
existing arrangement [of the Judicial Council] has presented no visible 
problems and no changes seem appropriate.”225 
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Looking to a 60-year history that is devoid of any significant 
problems, and to the considered opinions of legal professionals of all 
political persuasions, both inside and outside Alaska, we conclude that 
the merit selection system has succeeded in creating and sustaining an 
independent and competent judiciary. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The delegates to Alaska’s Constitutional Convention understood 
well the tension between an independent judiciary and popular 
sovereignty. The delegates sought to balance these tensions by creating 
the Judicial Council, evenly divided between attorneys, who would know 
well the abilities of their fellow attorneys, and lay members, who would 
represent the broader public, to find the best qualified candidates to 
nominate for appointment. The delegates then provided for the choice 
among the best qualified to be made by the governor, recognizing that 
elections have consequences. Finally, the delegates provided for the 
people to have the final say, after a suitable period on the bench for the 
new judge to develop a record. 
The delegates above all wished to assure that the new state would 
have a judiciary that was independent of the other branches of 
government, that would render fair decisions based on the law, and that 
would be free of political influences and considerations. 
Article IV has survived challenges both in court and in the 
legislature. And, as the Alaska Constitution begins its seventh decade, 
merit selection has been widely recognized as the best vehicle to assure 
the continued excellence of the Alaska judicial system. 
 
